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When does notice to an officer of one company received as officer of
another estop p the first? -Decision on bill of intervention gives Cir. C.
of Appeals jurisdiction.--Trust Co. v. R. R. Co., 48 Fed. Rep. 850.
A railroad was built, equipped, and bonds were issued in pay-
ment therefor on the faith of the road and equipment. The con-
tractor was at the same time general manager and principal stock-
holder of the railroad company. He was also president of an
improvement company which furnished the equipment and roll-
ing stock without payment and without any oral or written con-
tract of sale. Certificates of completion upon faith of which the
bonds were issued stated that "there had been delivered in good
working order upon said railroad" a proportional amount "of
rolling stock and equipment," but did not state that the railroad
bought or owned it. And it was not by the contract the duty of
the contractor to furnish the same. The mortgagees brought
proceedings of foreclosure. The assignee of the improvement
company brought a bill of intervention praying that the receiver
of the road might be ordered to pay said assignee for the equip-
ment and rolling stock on the ground that no title had ever passed
to the railroad company. The master's report held that the legal
effect of this state of facts was to create the relation of bailer and
bailee between the improvement and the railroad companies. That
the improvement company was not estopped from setting up title
because its president was the contractor to build and general man-
ager of the railroad upon whose certificates of construction and
equipments bonds were issued whose prpceeds he received. The
court, in 48 Fed. Rep. 32, adopted this report and ordered the
receiver to pay the interveners accordingly. This appeal was taken
to the circuit court of appeals from the decree on the bill of inter-
vention. Was such decision on bill of intervention such a "final
decision " as gave the court jurisdiction ? Upon this the court
say : "The decision in the court below on the intervention of the
Hiawassee Co. was a final decision upon the matter distinct from
the general subject in litigation." * * "While perhaps
the court may, for its own protection, hereafter be compelled to
insist that causes pending in the circuit and district courts shall
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not be brought to this court for review piecemeal, we are not
inclined to enforce such a rule in this case, even if we have
authority so to do."
Upon the main question of estoppel the decision of the lower
court was reversed as follows : "The case does not require that
we should find that there was an actual sale of the rolling stock to
the railway company. Under the circumstances, as to the placing
of the rolling stock on the railway for use by the railway company
apparently as owner, the issuance of bonds by the trust company
on certificates, in accordance with the contract, based upon
this rolling stock and the beneficiary result thereof to Eager,
(the contractor), both Eager and the improvement company are
estopped in equity from attacking the railway company's title to
the rolling stock in question as against the interest of the bond-
holders. As to Eager, this estoppel ought not to be questioned,
and we are of opinion that it is equally clear as to the improve-
ment company, for it was charged with full notice of all the cir-
cumstances as fully as Eager himself was informed, and yet, as a
volunteer, aided Eager in obtaining the rolling stock, and in
delivering it upon the railroad, which otherwise he might not have
been able to do, and thereby obtained the issuance of bonds based
on delivery of the rolling stock on the railroad in good working
order, etc. The improvement company occupies the same posi-
tion as the owner who stands by in silence while another sells his
property. It is considered that the intervener stands in the shoes of
the improvement company, so far as the rolling stock is concerned,
and can assert no better title thereto than the improvement com-
pany could have asserted had no transfer been made."
Passengers' Enowledge of Regulations of Railroad Companies -
Admissibility of Parol Evidence to Vary Contract.-In .New York L. E.
&, W. R. Co. v. Winters' Adm'r., 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 356, decided in
February 1892, Winters purchased of defendant's ticket agent in
Boston an unlimited ticket for Chicago, paying an extra compen-
sation for a stop-over privilege at Olean, N. Y., and receiving the
agent's assurance that the ticket sold him would allow him to stop
over at Olean "by speaking to the conductor." He told the con-
ductor of his wish to stop over at Olean, who said that he would
"fix him all right," and punched his ticket but gave him no stop-
over check. On his resuming his ride from Olean he was ejected
for refusing to pay his fare, as the conductor would not accept his
cancelled ticket, and he had no stop-over check, which the rules
of the company required a passenger intending to stop over to
RECENT CASES.
obtain from the conductor. Held, that the R. R. Co. was liable
in damages for this wrong. The court said,: "Passengers on rail-
road trains are not presumed to know the rules and regulations
which are made for the guidance of conductors or other employees
of railroad companies as to the internal affairs of the company,
nor are they required to know them. In this case there is no evi-
dence that notice or knowledge of the existence of the rules of the
defendant company, or what they were with respect to stop-over
regulations, was brought home to the plaintiff at the time he pur-
chased his ticket or at any time thereafter. There was nothing
on the face of the ticket to show that a stop-over check was
required of the passenger as a condition precedent to his resuming
his journey from Olean to Salamanca after stopping off at the
former place. It is shown by the evidence that Olean was a sta-
tion at which stop-over privileges were allowed. Under such cir-
cumstances it was entirely proper for the passenger to make
inquiries of the ticket agent and to rely upon what the latter told
him with respect to his stopping over at Olean. * *
The reason of such rule is to be found in the principle that when
a party does all that be is required to do under the terms of a
contract into which he has entered and is only prevented from
reaping the benefit of such contrafct by the fault or wrongful act
of the other party to it, the law gives him a remedy against the
other party for such breach of contract." With regard to the
admission of parol evidence to vary the contract between the par-
ties constituted by the ticket and the regulation of the company,
the language of the court is as follows: "While it may be
admitted as a general rule that the contract between the passenger
and the railroad company is made up of the ticket which he pur-
chased and the rules and regulations of the road, yet it does not
follow that parol evidence of what was said between the passenger
and the ticket seller, from whom he purchased his ticket at the
time of such purchase, is inadmissible as going to make up the
contract of carriage and forming part of it."
Injunction -Remozal of School House -_Rights of a Tax Payer.-
In Grav~es v. Jas~er School Township, 50 N. W. Rep. 904, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota has decided a very novel and
interesting case. It regards the rights of an elector and property
owner in determining the situation of the school-house for the dis-
trict in which he resides, and the manner of asserting such rights.
The school board of Jasper township attempted to remove the
school-house of sub-district No. r to sub-district No. 5, and to pre-
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vent this the plaintiff sued out an injunction against the board.
He objected to such removal on the grounds that his children
would be obliged to go two and three-quarters miles to school
instead of a half mile, as formerly; and that it would necessitate
the imposition of an extra tax upon his property. The action
turned upon two points, viz. : (i) The right of the plaintiff in such
case to invoke equity on his behalf, and (2) The right of tax-pay-
ers in regard to the location of school-houses. As to the first,
the court held that while ordinarily it is the duty of a public cor-
poration to bring a suitable action against any of its officers who
are acting fraudulently or beyond the scope of their powers, yet
if such corporation does not or will not bring such action, anyone
immediately affected by the abuse may proceed to vindicate his
rights. Also that there would seem to be no substantial reason
why a bill by or on behalf of individual tax-payers should not be
entertained to prevent the misuse of corporate powers. (Dillon
on Municipal Corporations, and Crampton v. Zabriskie, ioi U. S.
6oi.) Then too the plaintiff's interest was not joint and common
with that of the other tax-payers of his sub-district, but his injury
was an individual one, inasmuch as it imposed an equal tax upon
him, who would be injured, and upon others, who would be bene-
fited, by the proposed removal. Therefore he had in such case
abqndant right to invoke equity to restrain such action. As to
the second question, it was decided that when a school-house has
once been legally located, it can be removed only by competent
authority ; and such competent authority rests not in the township
school board, but in the will of the majority of the voters resident
in the subdistrict, as expressed in a public election. "It is not in
the power of a township school board, or of any number of citizens
of a sub-district, to make such removal without that vote being
taken and so declared, and any attempt to do so is without the
solemn sanction of the electors, and is illegal and void." As it
had appeared in evidence that the board had acted on its own
reponsibility, and that no vote of the electors had been taken on
the matter, it was held that the proposed removal could not be
made.
Constitutional Law- Inter-State Commerce - License.- The case
of Harmon v. City of Chicago, 29 N. E. 732 (Ill.) considers at
length one phase of the much mooted inter-State commerce ques-
tion. The facts are briefly these. The plaintiff, Harmon, owned
twelve steam tugs, plying in waters around the city of Chicago,
and licensed by the United States to engage in inter-State com-
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merce. The Chicago City Council passed an ordinance taxing
tugs, etc., twenty-five dollars each. Harmon paid the license tax
under protest, and immediately brought proceedings in assumpsit,
resting on the general proposition that the city of Chicago had
no right to exact a license fee from boats engaged in inter-State
commerce, on the ground that such an ordinance was unconstitu-
tional,' conflicting with the congressional power of regulating
commerce. The defendant sought first to sustain the validity of
the city ordinance on the ground that its enforcement was an
exercise of police power. The court having decided this proposi-
tion untenable, the defendant contended, on rehearing, that the
harbor being dredged and kept in general repair at the expense
of the city of Chicago, the license fee charged vessels should be
regarded merely as a proper compensation for the use of the
water course and not as a tax upon the commerce in which such
vessels were engaged. Having admitted that if the ordinance
was in any proper sense a regulation of inter-State commerce, so
far as it was so, it was repugnant to that provision of the constitu-
tion granting to congress the power to regulate commerce among
the several States, and therefore void, the court said that it was
equally clear that the city of Chicago, under statutory authority
having improved the harbor and river at its own expense, could
exact from vessels using the water course a reasonable compensa-
tion for the improvements thus furnished. This clause of the
constitution and also that forbidding any State to levy imports or
tonnage duties has reference in any given case only to the use of
the highways, whether on land or water, in their natural state.
" It did not contemplate that such highways could not be
improved by artificial means, and for outlays caused by such work
the State may exact reasonable tolls," (Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S.
543). As to whether such tolls could legally take the form of a
license upon the tugs which navigated the river the court held
that such was a proper mode of exacting compensation for the
benefits conferred.
Railroad Companies- Accidents at Crossings- Trespasses- Con-
tributory Negligence.- In the case of Aehnrich v. Mich. Cent. R. B. Co.,
49 N. W. Rep. 890 (Mich.), it was held that where aboy of fourteen
years, in attempting to cross a track upon which an engine was
standing in plain sight, and in so doing, instead of squarely cross-
ing, turns his back upon the engine and walks along the track for
a short distance, and in consequence thereof is struck and injured,
it is notper se negligence, but is a question of fact for a jury; and
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furthermore that when one in using a street for the purpose of travel
comes to a railroad-crossing, he not only has a right to cross, but to
walk upon it in order to get to a more direct route, and while so
doing is not a trespasser so long as the track continues along the
street, distinguishing case of Kel y v. Railroad Co., 65 Mich. i86.
EstoApel- Proof of Handwriting.- In Tunstall v. Cobb, 14 S. E.
Rep. 28 (N. Car.), B. conveyed land to the plaintiff by a deed
which was duly registered. Afterwards an indorsement was
made on the deed, purporting to be signed by the plaintiff, and
relinquishing all his right to the deed. B. moved back upon the
land and was permitted to occupy it until his death without pay-
ing rent. He paid the taxes, and the plaintiff several times
declared that he had no claim to the land. B. died, devising the
land to one of the defendants. The court held that the indorse-
ment did not operate as a reconveyance of the land, nor was the
plaintiff estopped by his conduct from claiming the land, although
the defendant, in a court of equity, might en-force the endorse-
ment as a contract to reconvey, if a valuable consideration could
be shown to have passed. The genuineness of the plaintiff's sig-
nature to the endorsement was disputed, and, to prove it genuine,
the defendant produced a paper, which was not connected with
the case, bearing the plaintiff's signature, which a witness testi-
fied to be genuine. An expert was called to compare the two sig-
natures. The court held, Clark, J., dissenting, that it was an
error to allow the comparison, and said: "In North Carolina it
seems to be settled law that an expert, in the presence of the jury,
may be allowed to compare the disputed paper with other papers
in the case whose genuineness is not denied, and also with such
papers as the party whose handwriting gives rise to the contro-
versy is estopped to deny the genuineness of, or concedes to be
genuine; but no comparison by the jury is permitted." The
decisions of the American courts on this subject have not been
harmonious. See i Greenl. Ev. §§578-581 and i Whart. Ev. §713.
Zicense-Revocation.-Croasdale v. Lannigan, 29 N. E. Rep. 824,
decided that a mere verbal license given to an adjoining owner to
erect a retaining wall on the licensor's land is revocable after the
erection of such wall. The court said: "There has been much
contrariety of decision in the courts of different States and juris-
dictions, but the courts in this State have upheld with great
* steadiness the general rule that a parol license to do an act on
the land of the licensor, while it justifies anything done by the
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licensee before revocation, is nevertheless revocable at the option
of the licensor; and this although the intention was to confer a
continuing right, and money had been expended by the licensee
upon the faith of the licensor. This we believe is the rule
required by public policy. It prevents the burdening of lands
with restrictions founded upon oral agreements easily misunder-
stood. It gives security and certainty to titles, which are most
important to be preserved against defects and qualifications not
founded upon solemn instruhaents. The jurisdiction of courts to
enforce oral contracts for the sale of land is clearly defined and
well understood, and is indisputable. But to change what com-
menced in a license into an irrevocable right, on the ground of
equitable estoppel, is another and quite a different matter." It
was better, the court said, that the law requiring interests in
land to be evidenced by deed should be observed, than to leave it
to the chancellor to construe an executed license as a grant de-
pending upon what, in his view, might be considered equity in a
given case.
Agency- Unauthorized Sale by a Drummer of His SajP~les.-Sav-
age v. Pelton et al., 27 Pac. Rep. 948 (Col.), was a case where a trav-
elling salesman employed to sell goods from samples which he
carried in trunks furnished for that purpose, sold his trunks and
their contents. In deciding that such sale was beyond the agent's
authority and therefore void, and that the power to sell was not
to be implied from the character of the agency, nor from the ordi-
nary methods used in its execution, the court say: "The law is
clear that the limits of an agent's authority are to be found in the
instructions of his principal. This general rule is necessarily sub-
ject to the modification that the agent is entitled to employ all the
necessary and usual means of executing the principal's authority,
and that this implied power is frequently modified by his right to
use all the ordinary means justified by the usages of thd trade in
which he is engaged. Neither of these principles is broad enough
to confer upon an agent, employed to solicit orders for goods
upon the strength of samples furnished him, authority to sell
those things which are essentially necessary to the performance of
his duties."
Contributory Negligence- Question for Court.- Emry v. Raleigh &
G. R. Co., 14 S. E. Rep. 352 (N. C.), was a case involving contrib-
utory negligence, and was brought up on error of the lower court
in failing to charge the jury as to what constituted such negli-
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gence. In remanding the case the court said, in substance : It is
not the province of the jury to ascertain and determine what is
negligence or what is reasonable diligence. When, however, the
facts are to be found by the jury from conflicting evidence upon
issues of fact, the court should submit the evidence to them with
appropriate instructions as to the varying aspects of the evidence.
It should carefully instruct them that, if they found one state of
facts, then there is negligence ; if a second, then there is no neg-
ligence; if a third, then there is or is not, as the case may be.
It is not sufficient or proper to instruct the jury to consider and
determine whether "a prudent man" would or would not do the
things in question, and to be governed by their best judgment in
that respect. This would practically leave it to them to decide
what did or did not constitute negligence or reasonable diligence
in the case before them, whereas they should receive the law
from the court, and finding the facts, apply them to the instruc-
tions they so received, and not otherwise. The jury cannot decide
that there is or is not negligence in view of the evidence and facts
before them, by deciding what in their judgment, "a prudent
man" would think of the facts, and how he would probably act
upon them.
Taxation of Leased Rolling Stock-Interstate Commerce. -Denver
Rio Grande Railway Co. v. Church, County Treasurer, 28 Pacific
Rep. 468 (Colorado.) Plaintiff railway company had in its pos-
session and was operating certain cars, owned by and leased from
the Pullman Car Co., which was located and had its domicile in
another State, and in operating the road these cars frequently
passed by connecting lines into the adjoining States. The State
Board of Equalization assessed these cars for taxation and the
plaintiff brought this action to enjoin the defendant from collect-
ing the taxes thereon. The plaintiff claimed that the State had
no right to tax these cars since they were the property of a for-
eign corporation, and that because these cars frequently ran on
connecting lines and passed into other States, they were employed
in interstate commerce and, therefore, this taxation was a violation
of that clause of the Federal Constitution which gives Congress
power " to regulate commerce * * * among the sev-
eral States." The court held, relying upon Car Co. v. Com-
missioners, ii Sup. Court Rep. 876, that, since these cars were
operated by the Denver & Rio Grande Railway Co., and in
their possession and leased to them under contract with the Pull-
man Car Co., the State had the right to tax them; and that the
176 .
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clause of the Constitution above referred to does in no way inhibit
this taxation, although these cars pass into adjoining States and
Territories.
Conveyance Absolute in Form - Evidence to Adjudge the Same as
kortgage. -Perot v. Cooper, 28 Pac. Rep. 391 (Colorado.) Defen-
dant gave plaintiff three promissory notes, in consideration of
a loan. On the same day that the loan was made, the defen-
dant entered into an "agreement" or contract with the plaintiff
by which "in consideration of one dollar and other good and val-
uable considerations," he covenanted and agreed "to transfer and
convey to said Perot certain interests in certain stocks, bonds, lands,
letters patent, etc." In this action, the defendant claimed that
the above contract was collateral to and intended to secure the
payment of aforesaid promissory notes. The court held'in refer-
ence to the claim of the defendant as follows: "A conveyance
absolute in form may be found and adjudged to be a mortgage in
fact, when it is shown by evidence, clear, certain, unequivocal
and trustworthy, that such instrument was executed, delivered,
accepted, and intended by the parties merely as collateral to
secure the payment of a debt. * * We are not prepared to say
that an instruction as to the quantum of proof in cases of this kind
must necessarily contain the words ' beyond a reasonable doubt'
borrowed from the criminal law. * * But where there is a sub-
stantial conflict in the evidence, a mere preponderance is not suffi-
cient to warrant a change in the character of a deed or other sol-
emn instrument of writing."
W'hen can Self Criminating Testimony given in a previousproceeding be
admitted in a subsequent criminalproceeding ?-U. S. v. Smitl, 47 Fed.
Rep. 5oi. The respondent was indicted for forgery. He had volun-
tarily testified before the Grand Jury to shift and fix the criminality
on another. This testimony he sought to contradict at his trial. To
the receipt of the testimony given before the Grand Jury objec-
tion was made based upon Sec. 86o R. S., which provides among
other things, that: "No * * * discovery or evidence
obtained from a party or witness by means of a judicial proceeding
* * * shall be given in evidence, or in any manner used
against him * * * in court of the U. S. in any criminal
proceeding." The objection was overruled as follows: "The
object" of this statute "was to remove the personal privilege, so
that evidence against others might be compulsorily obtained. *
• * This statute was not designed to protect a party from the
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consequence of making inconsistent statements for the purpose of
wrongfully fixing crime upon another, and thereby shielding him-
self, but rather to protect from prosecutions based upon affirma-
tive evidence as to transactions which involve the witness with
others in questionable proceedings." The lack of the element of
compulsion is to be remarked in this case as distinguishing it from
apparently antagonistic cases.
Banks-Damages for a Refusal, Through Mistake, to Cash a
Check.- Schaffner v. Ehrman, 28 N. E. 917 (Ill). Through a cash-
ier's mistake the appellee's deposit at appellant's bank appeared
to be less than it was, and in consequence four of the appellee's
checks were returned through the clearing house marked,
"Refused for want of funds." No actual malice or fraud on
the part of the bank, or special injury to appellee was shown,
but the court, citing Prelin v. Bank, L. R. 5 Exch. 92, and Patter-
son v. Bank, 130 Pa. St. 419, was of the opinion that the case con-
tained the elements of slander, viz. : (i) a tendency to bring the
appellee into disrepute, and (2) malice. The returning of the
marked checks would naturally tend to bring a trader into disre-
pute and materially damage his credit, and the fact that he is a
trader takes the place of special damages. All the elements of
legal malice were present, the refusal was intentional and with-
out just excuse. The court therefore held that there was no
error in the award of substantial damages. There was, however,
one dissenting vote, Craig, J., holding that the action, though in
form tort, was founded upon a contract and therefore the plaintiff
was only entitled to recover such damage as the evidence might
show he had sustained.
Construction of Wills-Amount of Legacy. -Bush v. Couchman, 17
S. W. Rep. 1020 (Ky.) was an action by the widow of a testator
to recover rent for certain land, under the following codicil: "I
desire my said wife, in addition to the $3,000 given to her in my
will, to have a sum equivalent to the rent of the land derived by
her from her father's estate, and which I have used or received
rent from ever since it became her property." The main diffi-
culty was to determine the meaning of the word rent and whether
the recovery should be confined to the amount due up to the date
of the will or to the death of the testator. The executor interpreted
the word rent to include only net rent, viz.: the amount left after
deducting the expense of repairs, taxes, etc. The court held that
she was not seeking to recover the amount of rent due to her
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from the testator for the use of the land by him-for to this she
had no legal right-but a bequest of a sum of money equivalent
to that rent, and she was in consequence entitled to the whole
rental value of the land. "As the will takes effect at the death
of the testator, and not at the date of the will, unless it appears
that it was so intended-and as it does not so appear in this case-
it was right to estimate the rent to the time of the death of the
testator."
Torts of Employees-Ziabiliy of Princital.-In Gillingham v. Ohio
River Railroad Co. I4 S. E. Rep. 243 (W. Va.), the conductor of
the defendant's train caused the arrest of the plaintiff, who at the
time of arrest was an orderly and well behaved passenger. The
arrest was made by a police officer upon the request and under
the directions of the conductor, who was mistaken in supposing
the plaintiff to be the person who a short time before had. made
an assault upon him. The arrest was insisted upon by the con-
ductor, although the plaintiff and a fellow passenger stated that
he (the plaintiff) was not the person who had made the assault.
Both the assault and the arrest were made at a time when the
conductor was not required or expected by the defendant to perform
duties as a conductor, but he was on and about the train acting in
that capacity. The conductor testified at the trial that the act of
pointing out the plaintiff to the officer who made the arrest was a
personal one, and that the arrest was made while he was off duty as
a conductor. However, it was held that, he being on the train,
and acting and speaking as one in charge, receiving passengers
and making reading to start, the defendant was responsible for his
acts consistent with his duties as a conductor.
